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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to illustrate the processes involves in ‘making up’ the human kind of self 
harmers. Psychiatric attempts at defining, explaining, and controlling self harm 
behaviours are shaped by the people who they diagnose as much as they shape those who 
they are diagnosing. This relationship goes further, as the labelled respond to their 
category, the category changes, which alters the way in which they behave, which then 
again shifts the meaning of the category (Hacking, 2006). Medicine is a force that shapes 
and structures people’s experiences of themselves, and through power relationships the 
array of available actions is limited to the individual (Foucault, 1982; Rose, 2007). In this 
thesis, Hacking, Foucault and Rose’s theories will be illustrated and grounded by an 
extensive historiography using psychiatric journals, and applied to rich data gathered 
using internet forums. This thesis comprises both a history of the emergence and 
development of the concept of self harm, (i.e. the ‘making up’ of the category of self 
harmers) and an examination of the modern understandings of self harm (Hacking, 2006), 
using two clinical self harm discussion boards and two emo forums taken from a two 
week period in June. From this data, four themes were selected (use of medical discourse, 
identity presentation, integration with medical professionals and concealment) and will 
be discussed in detail. The ‘looping effect’ is illustrated using clinical self harmers, where 
their relationship with medical discourses is shown to influence both their understanding 
of self harm, and medicine’s knowledge of self harm. A second group of emo self 
harmers will be compared and contrasted to the clinical self harmers, and their 
relationship to the medical sphere evaluated. These analyses shall demonstrate that the 
relationship between medicine and emo self harmers is predominantly unidirectional; 
medicine studies these teenagers closely, yet emo self harmers do not engage with the 
medical discourses. It will be shown that the two groups see themselves very differently 
in relation to medicine; clinical self harmers offered themselves to medicalisation readily, 
but emo self harmers are not medicalised to the same extent.  
 
Key Terms: 
Foucault,  Kinds of People,  Looping Effect,  Medicalisation,  Power,  Self Harm 
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Making Up Self Harmers: an investigation of the concept over time and from the 
perspective of two different self harm groups 
 
Self harm is an emotive topic. ‘Harm’ in itself is a loaded term and part of its potency 
comes from being both noun and a verb; harm is both the result and the action. To turn a 
harmful force upon oneself contradicts many assumptions about life. . Potentially, some 
of the more disturbing connotations of self harm occur because of the abstracted 
language, the vagueness being filled in by our imagination. We do not know what 
someone means by ‘harm’; there are too many possible meanings. Here we also come to 
one of the key problems: the definition of self harm that is used by individuals who self 
harm is not standardised, nor is it necessarily used in the same way by psychiatrists and 
medical practitioners (Laye-Gindhu & Schonert-Reichl, 2005). 
 
The structure of this thesis is simple. This introduction will detail the problems 
encountered by psychiatry when attempting to define self harm, the aims and motivations 
for research, and the methods and ethical concerns which are salient. Following this, the 
necessary theoretical background will be discussed. Part one consists of a chronology of 
the development of the concept of self harm. This section is predominantly intended to 
show the negotiation of boundaries and the ‘making up’ of a new human kind. Part two 
and three rely on rich data to illustrate how two different populations relate to the 
category of self harm. Following on from these analyses, it will be concluded that these 
two populations interact with the psychiatric understanding in very different ways.  
 
This thesis will argue that the behaviours which are understood as being self harming are 
not new behaviours. There are many available examples of behaviours that qualify as self 
harming, however they would not now be classified as such. To illustrate, mediaeval 
saints and holy women (such as Catherine of Siena) were harming themselves through 
Anorexia mirabilis (literally, miraculous lack of appetite). Despite literally falling under 
the heading of ‘self harm’ this behaviour does not fit in with our contemporary 
expectations of a typical self harming action. A more modern example to illustrate this 
problem could be smoking tobacco; literally, it is a self harming behaviour, but due to 
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what ever reason, it is ill-fitting within the category of self harm. Another, somewhat 
more graphic example involves the art movement of Viennese Actionism; artists such as 
Schwarzkogler, Nitsch, Brus and Müehl were routinely mutilating themselves as an 
aesthetic performance in the late 1960s intending to transgress and question societal 
norms (Tate Modern, 2009). These examples are very different to the common 
understanding of a self harmer, an emotionally charged, distressed and traumatised 
individual (Scoliers et al. 2008) So, it is clear that there is something that has emerged as 
the  psychiatric category ‘self harm’, which involves more than the strict original 
denotation, which brings societal expectations and norms into the definition (Turp, 2002).  
 
The definition of self harm is still unstable (Laye-Gindhu & Schonert-Reichl, 2005). 
Although self harm has been used in clinical psychiatric circles for a few decades, but it 
is not currently in the DSM-iv (the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (APA 1994)) as a 
mental illness in its own right. Instead, self harm is described as symptom of mental 
illness, such as borderline personality disorder (APA, 1994, p. 654). Despite not being 
formally defined and explained in the DSM, self harm still is present in the medical, 
psychiatric and psychological literature and frequently investigated as a stand alone 
phenomenon. This causes complications: a non-standardised definition of self harm has 
been used for too long; two research articles claiming to investigate self harm can differ 
widely in their understanding of self harm (compare Turp, 2002, and Fortune, Sinclair & 
Hawton, 2008). It is worth noting that the incorporation of a deviant behaviour into the 
medical sphere is not necessarily progressive: “there are still compelling reasons for 
worrying about the tendency to portray social and psychological phenomena as medical 
problems” (Nye, 2003, p. 115), as this delineates our own behaviour as medical territory. 
The integration of the abnormal, the deviant and the immoral into the realm of medicine 
may have the effect of limiting the potential actions which are available.  
 
This leads to another issue surrounding the concept of self harm: who is to it? Western 
biomedicine presents itself as a universal science, equally applicable and useful to 
everyone. As psychiatry sees itself as part of this medical science, how can it come to 
terms with the cultural specificity of self harm? If self harm is declared a Western culture 
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bound syndrome then medicine’s claim to universality and materialism is compromised: 
psychiatric medicine would no longer have exclusive control over the knowledge 
surrounding self harm, due to culturally bound syndromes having a precarious place in 
Western medicine. Consequently, self harm would not be taken seriously. So, psychiatric 
medicine stresses the pervasiveness of self harm using statistics and terms of medical 
universality to imply a global problem as to maintain is dominance (e.g. Scoliers, et al. 
2008).  
 
Western biomedicine’s perspective on mental illness is clothed with cultural beliefs and 
assumptions in the same way as ethnomedical models (Helman, 1978). This is best 
illustrated by scarification. In one setting, Western societies view scarification activities 
as deviant, problematic and a sign of mental illness (despite their increasing prevalence 
amongst body-modifiers1). In another setting, such as in societies in Papua New Guinea, 
Australia, Africa and others the same Westerners see scarification as exotic, traditional, 
symbolically and culturally rich (Cole & Haebich, unpublished). There are also examples 
from within a single culture. Not all that long ago, tattoos were considered a sign of 
degeneracy, criminality and deviancy (Cole & Haebich, unpublished). Today, tattoos are 
common among the middle classes. This demonstrates that western medicine is neither 
acultural nor ahistorical.    
 
As stated above, the concept of self harm is still being negotiated by many stakeholders: 
psychiatry, those who fall under the classification of self harm, and the public. However, 
it is not only journals of psychology, psychiatry and medicine that are debating the 
meaning of self harm. Those who fall under the label (whether self-declared or 
institutionally diagnosed) also have an active part in classifying self harm. The 
relationship between an individual’s agency, emotion and identity, with psychiatric 
knowledge is a point of tension between individual and society. It is in this space where 
compliance and resistance occurs, the influence of generated knowledge can be seen to be 
acting on individuals, as can the action of the categorised be seen to impact on the 




 See www.bme.com 
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Throughout this thesis, the historical development of self harm will be outlined in relation 
to the historical development in the medical literature. This will be embedded into the 
wider discourse of the medicalisation of people’s bodies and emotions, and the power 
relations involved in doing so. The relationship between self defined clinical self 
harmers
2
 (including the subgroup of self labelled ‘survivors’) and the wider discourses of 
medicine will be investigated. Similarly, self defined emo
3
 self harmers will be analysed 





Self harm will be shown as a point where many issues regarding agency, identity, 
emotion, society and psychology are performed using the human body. In this sensitive 
subject, it is especially clear to see the relationships of power play out between 
institutions of psychiatry and medicalised individuals. A broadly Foucauldian approach 
will be employed to analyse the issues involved. The process of medicalisation will be 
the main focus. More specifically, the impact of knowledge and power upon people’s 
behaviour will be evaluated in terms of how the construction of ‘kinds’ of people develop 
(Hacking, 2006).  
 
A suspicious attitude would see medicalisation as suggesting “something suspect when a 
problem is created or annexed, in whole or in part, by the apparatus of medicine”, 
motivated by doctors “extending their empire” (Rose, 2007, p. 700). To have this 
malicious intention assumes that medicine is united and unanimously aiming for the same 
target, whatever that might be. Considering the fractured and disparate identity of 




 By this, I mean self harmers which are already medicalised in some way, through possessing a medical 
diagnosis such as depression or anxiety disorder. The clinical self harmers used in this study are self 
defined clinical self harmers, so see themselves as fitting what they see as a psychiatric classification.  
3
 Emo self harmers will be defined in detail later. As this point, it is necessary to understand emo as a youth 
subculture which has particular styles of music and fashion, and is associated (rightly or wrongly) with self 
harm.  
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has had a profound effect on our forms of life: it has made us what we are” (2007, p. 
700). This medical knowledge can alter how we experience ourselves and the world.  
 
Foucault (1982) argues that the established scientific universals concerning human nature 
are constructed by society’s upper strata (e.g. medicine, the state) and are consequences 
of society’s ethical and political ideas. These ideas are codified, and then reflected and 
absorbed by the masses. This constructed medical knowledge, which is “presented as an 
objective, incontrovertible scientific discovery… [is] in fact the product of eminently 
questionable social and ethical commitments” (Gutting, 2008); medicine is not an 
ultimate truth, just the current, culturally-informed beliefs which are upheld by power 
relations. As self harm is an issue of moral contention, the imprint of these ethical 
commitments should be evident on the discourses surrounding the concept. It is this 
productive force that will be shown to subjectify self harmers into a system of relations. 
This understanding of power is taken from Foucault: power is a “productive network 
which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose 
function is repression” (Foucault, in Rabinow, 1986, p. 61). This understanding of power 
is much more than top-down, forcing certain behaviours and beliefs on to the masses, 
instead, this power regulates through self monitoring discipline. Furthermore, this power 
can transgress boundaries, it is productive and creates knowledge and discourses.  
 
Reflecting Foucault’s usual analysis on those at the periphery of society’s relationship 
with the dominant bourgeoisie, self harming individuals
4
 are an interesting and valid case 
which to apply these ideas; by studying self harming individuals we may more clearly see 
the expectations and beliefs of those who hold the power through their positions as 
generators of knowledge. Self harming individuals are at the periphery of society, 
marginalised and forced under the scrutiny of the medical gaze. However, there is 
evidence that the scientific, psychiatric and medical knowledge generated is not passively 




 For our purposes, only those who identify themselves as someone who self harms will be discussed. 
There is a whole domain of body modifiers (see www.BMEzine.com for examples of this sub-culture) who 
are altering the skin they possess for aesthetic or hedonistic purposes. This groups relation to being 
categorised as ‘self harmers’ is worthy of further study, but is beyond the scope this thesis.  
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to, or used to structure their experiences, and impacts upon the way their experience 
themselves.  
 
The body is a key place to witness the interaction of historical forces on a canvas that we 
assume to be natural and of which we assume to have an objective understanding. The 
body is seen to be objectifiable, and consistent through time, but historical analyses show 
that the perception and expectations of the body actually change. The body is the site 
where ideas and social reality cross; it is the point where objectivity and subjectivity 
cross: 
 
  We believe, in any event, that the body obeys the exclusive laws of physiology and 
that it escapes the influence of history, but this too is false. The body is molded by 
a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest and 
holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through eating habits or moral laws, it 
constructs resistances. (Foucault, 1977, p. 87).  
 
This is due to the objective and subjective capacities of the body that can reveal so much 
about society. It is for this reason that self harming behaviour – an act upon the body – is 
such an interesting study.  
 
In the study of self harm as an evolving psychiatric category, we can see how the actions 
of the physical self are seen in terms of a mental or psychological problem. To translate 
an action on the body into a psychological issue is changing the description under which 
an act lies (see Anscombe, 1959; Hacking, 1995) and involves a leap across modalities. 
The way in which bodily acts are used to infer mental state is not new; indeed it is the 
subject of Foucault’s genealogical analysis in Madness and Civilisation and History of 
Sexuality (1967, 1978) and in Hacking’s Rewriting the Soul (1995). 
 
Foucault’s ideas are particularly important for this study. He explored ideas that medicine 
coerces individuals into becoming self regulating persons, disciplining themselves into 
complying with the categories applicable to them. Locating the normalising force within 
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the individuals removes the need for conspicuous force, and has an effect of 
homogenising deviances (there is a ‘way’ to be homosexual, there is a normal way to 
experience multiple personality, there are norms of being a self harmer) and confirming 
these categories. The process of medicalisation takes a social problem and defines it 
using medical rhetoric, enabling the powerful forces of scientific biomedicine to 
pathologize aspects of normal life, so as to describe, define and control beyond the 
legitimate biological boundary (Rose, 2007).  
 
It is intended that this work will show the objectification of those classified as self 
harmers. According to Foucault, this objectification can occur in three ways: firstly, 
through “dividing practices”, secondly through “scientific classification” and lastly 
through “subjectification” (Foucault, in Rabinow, (1986) pp. 7-11). Over the following 
pages, the dividing practices, scientific classification and subjectification will be made 
apparent in relation to self harming emos and clinical self harmers.  
 
The second theoretical perspective that influences this thesis is Hacking. Hacking builds 
upon Foucault’s work, arguing that knowledge has the power to shape the identity of 
individuals, creating ‘kinds’ of people, one of which is the psychiatric category of self 
harmers. As it will be proposed that self harming individuals are being forged into a kind 
of person -in the same way that multiple personality (Hacking, 1995) and the autistic 
child (Hacking, 2006) were made into types of people- it is necessary to explain the basis 
of Hacking’s theory.  
 
Hacking believes that ‘kinds’ of people can come into existence, in a type of “dynamic 
nominalism” (ibid, p. 3). By this, he means that through the creation, but more 
importantly the co-evolution of the name through its interaction with the labelled group 
(c.f. Wittgenstein’s, nominalism). Hacking argues that the sciences can create a new type 
of person: a new way for someone to be understood, and a new way of experiencing 
oneself through this label (ibid, p. 6). Casting people into moulds enables them to be 
under the medical gaze, so knowledge can be generated to control, help, organise 
understand and emulate (ibid, p. 2). In a three-way co-dependent cycle, the classification 
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– in our case, self harm – affects the individual’s understanding of self harm, which in 
turn alters their behaviour, and leads to a shift in the way the classification is understood, 
and the cycle continuing. It is from this framework that those classified as self harmers 
will be explored. Hacking’s dynamic nominalism theory will be considered as a basic 
framework from which to understand the emergence and evolution of self identified self 
harmers.  
 
Throughout this thesis, it is intended that the body as a symbolic site will be maintained 
as a theme; how we possess, and control and perform in our bodies is symbolic of our 
relationship with ourselves and society. Our bodies are the site of the performance of 
identity: the “body as a method of self-expression” (Crozier, unpublished, p. 12). As our 
experiences of our own bodies are affected by how our selves are socially constructed, 
(Rose, 2007) our behaviours and the performance of identity will be both a 
communication to others and a reflection of how we see society’s perception of us.  
 
This research will be conducted on online discussion boards. Over the last decade, digital 
media has become commonplace and prevalent, becoming increasingly accessible to a 
wide range of individuals and institutions, and consequently, the internet has become 
another location to observe social interaction (Ito et al., 2008, p. vii). Not only is internet 
media present in everyday life, but it has also affected “how we engage in knowledge 
production, communication, and creative expression” (ibid). These new ways of 
connecting with others in a digital dimension can therefore be subjected to analysis as 
validly as any other social communication. As language is still the predominant 
communication online (bolstered with emoticons and profile pictures) is it suitable to 
analyse the discourses, which are shown in the linguistic choices. Forums have been used 
as data for many studies investigating identity (see Buckingham, 2008, for a collection of 
research based using internet sites). Much more similar to this thesis is Dias’ work on the 
discourses present on pro ana sites (Dias, 2003), where this online community was 
investigated in relation to pro-anorexia sites, medical and psychiatric discourses.  
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Aims and Motivations for Research 
 
In the course of this work, the historical development of this new type of person will be 
plotted from its beginning as a form of failed suicide to the modern medical 
understanding of self harm as being a symptom of mental disorders. In contrast to the 
official definition of self harm, the meaning of self harm as used by the self labelled self 
harm groups will be evaluated, with attention to how they use, understand, negotiate and 
use self harm as a category will be studied as an aspect of their identity(in relation to 
Hacking’s looping effect (2006)). How self harmers relate to medical treatment (in terms 
of how they see themselves, how they uphold/resist a medical understanding of 
themselves and their experiences, how they perform a medicalised identity) and 
personnel, and the theme of concealment will also be discussed.   
 
Psychiatric journal articles will be used to assess how current professionals locate self 
harm in psychiatric space and plot its development over time. The grassroots’ 
understanding of self harm will be analysed from two contrasting perspectives. The first 
group consists of clinical patients (typically those who have been diagnosed as having 
mental illnesses, and are or have been receiving a form of treatment) who are 
participating on either the National Self Harm Network
5
 (henceforth shortened to NSHN) 
or the self harm page of the Mental Health Forum
6
 (NHF). It will be assumed that 
members posting on the boards of these sites identify themselves as someone who self 
harms. In contrast to self harm in a clinical sphere, the postings of ‘emo-kids’ will also be 
subject to analysis.  
 
Emo is a well recognised youth sub-culture (see Frean, 2004; Frith, 2009; Skenker, 2009 
for recent reports on emo culture), which is characterised by “overt demonstrations of 
emotions, feeling misunderstood and self harming behaviour” (Scott & Chur-Hansen, 
2008, p. 360) and which have an identifiable style of clothes, music and behaviours (ibid, 




 http://www.nshn.co.uk  
6
 http://www.mentalhealthforum.net/forum/forumdisplay.php?f=29  
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glamorises disturbed sleeping patterns, and promotes internal angst
7
 (Greenwald, 2003; 
Simon & Kelley, 2007). The online discussion forums that will be used are taken from 
Emo Bucket website8 and Virtual Teen forum9 (shortened to EB and VT respectively). 
 
A possible objection to my methods could be based upon the arguments concerning the 
relationship between the ‘online’ and the ‘offline’ self. Despite the opportunity to present 
a character, Robinson found that those who portray themselves online “do not seek to 
transcend the most fundamental aspects of their offline selves” (2007, p. 94), as for most 
users of the web, the internet “enhances, extends, and supplements what they do offline” 
(Rainie, 2004, xiii). So, it can generally be assumed that the opinions expressed online are 
in effect a representation of what these groups say outside of the internet forum, and as 
such, a satisfactory way to evaluate the power involved in the medicalisation of the 
subject. Furthermore, as the use of the internet to communicate socially has increased 
rapidly with the invention and popularity of Twitter, MySpace, blogs Facebook and 
discussion forums – it is assumed that this communication is equally valid for analysis as 
speech.  
 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the clinical groups and the emo groups each have a 
collective identity, and that within these groups there are shared common ideas 
concerning self harm and mental health. It is also assumed that neither of these 
collectives are isolated, that they are aware of each other, the wider views of society and 
psychiatry on self harm.  
 
 
Methods and Ethics 
 
In this research, four online forums will be analysed for thematic content concerning 




 It is not unnoticed that the stereotypical behaviours are not dissimilar to the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual -iv (APA,1994) criteria for major depressive disorder. 
8
 http://forum.emobucket.com  
9
 http://www.virtualteen.org/forums/forumdisplay.php?s=&daysprune=&f=5  
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investigated (NSHN and MHF) as will two emo sites (VT and EB). Any new threads 
posted between the first and the 14
th
 of June will be subject to analysis. Content, in terms 
of conceptual ideas, language, common themes and features, of the online text will be 
reduces to key themes, which will be written and evaluated in detail. Other aspects of the 
forums will be neglected, such as profile pictures, signoff slogan and screen names used 
by the users, as well as the use of emoticons and images, and the web layout of the site. 
All this data is potentially rich, but it is outside the scope of this research.   
 
There is one methodological limitation to this investigation. Due to ethical guidelines 
imposed by the British Psychological Society policy, no direct quotes can be used. These 
ethical concerns stem from an expectation of privacy that may be present when writing to 
a forum audience. If an individual posts on a forum with the intention that only other 
forum readers have access to it, then to quote this use without his/her prior consent is 
unethical. Due to this, only public forums have been used: no passwords or logins were 
required to access the information; all quotes in this work are paraphrases resulting in the 
actual poster being anonymous.  
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Section I: Historical Development of the Concept of Self Harm 
 
In this section, the development of the concept self harm will be explored. Concepts are 
not universal; they come into existence, change meanings and eventually become 
obsolete. Self harming behaviour may have always existed, in some form or another, but 
the ‘kind’ of people with which we now associate with self harm is a recent development. 
Self harm’s birth and evolution will be followed historically from the 1950s until the 
present. The act of ‘making up people’ (Hacking, 2006) will be seen in the psychiatric 
literature, in the survivor and clinical self harm movement and the rival third perspective 
of emo self harmers. These three ways of looking at self harm has formed discourses that 
have produced a general image of what self harm, and a self harmer, is.  
 
Self harm has emerged out of the discourses on suicide. It used to be the case that acts of 
self harm were seen as mini-suicides, and as suicides used to be an issue for criminal 
courts and religious burial rites, the chief authority used to be religious or legal. It is now 
firmly in the territory of psychiatric medicine, which has identified itself as the source of 
generated knowledge on self harm. Furthermore, the general public also link self harm 
with mental illness, relying on medical knowledge to provide explanations and 
treatments. Because medicine’s power is due to its claim to universality, it was necessary 
for medical professional to associate self harm with psychiatric illness in order to be the 
dominant authority on self harm. Self harm gradually formed as a branch of suicide, and 
split off due to changing discourses. Suicide became a psychiatric issue before it was de-
criminalised in the UK, (Neeleman, 2007). After psychiatry became the dominant 
discourse concerning suicide, psychiatry also held power over subsumed categories, in 
this case self harm. In the following pages, the process of making up the category of self 
harm is delineated from its origins in suicide. The negotiation of a new category will 
form the contemporary understanding on self harm.  
 
Before the introduction of the Suicide Act 1961, suicide and attempted suicide were 
illegal in England and Wales. Despite this strong legal discourse, the medical sphere has 
been medicalising suicide for a long time, potentially as early as the 1830s (Hacking, 
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2006). Whether suicide was considered evil, wrong or the result of illness was the due to 
boundary work between these authorities, and, as time has shown, medicine gained 
dominance.  
 
In the 1950s, current understanding of self harm was very different to the contemporary 
understanding, but the idea that there was a behaviour which looked like a failed suicide, 
but which was different to a failed suicide began to emerge (Stengel, 1952). It is in this 
space where the category of self harm will develop. This division was based on the 
grounds that a failed suicide necessarily had to have a genuine intention to kill oneself, 
and merely by accidental chance did the suicide remain uncompleted. A suicide attempt 
had to have the intention of self destruction (1952, p. 613); Stengel acknowledged that 
there was something which could be called an insincere suicide, and the difference 
between this and an unsuccessful suicide was the “level of mental commitment” (1952, p. 
617). Not only is there a difference, but this difference creates two different groups of 
people, with different norms, intentions and thought patterns. Published medical 
knowledge at this time creates the typical self harmer as being: single (i.e. unattached, 
divorced or widowed), emotionally frail, more often than not having a prior mental 
condition, and likely to complete suicide in the future (Stengel, 1952, pp. 616-617). 
These are the first norms of the self harming person. 
 
Despite creating a linguistic paradox
10
, Stengel then proposes a continuum of suicide 
attempts, ranging from failed suicide to mild suicide attempts. There is an anomalous 
situation that does not fit into this spectrum: insincere suicide attempts which accidentally 
result in suicide (Stengel, 1952, p. 618). Obviously, it is impossible to know what the 
intention was in this case, but it is a case to be considered when reviewing statistics.  
 






 If suicide is by definition an intention to self destruct, then to have a weaker form of self destruction is no 
longer destruction, destruction is reduced to damage.  
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It becomes obvious that self-destruction cannot be the main and only purpose of 
the suicidal attempt. The self injury in most attempted suicides, however genuine, 
is insufficient to bring about death, and the attempts are made in a setting that 
makes the intervention of others possible, probable, or even inevitable. (1952, p. 
22).  
 
The division between suicide and this attempted suicide (with ambivalent intention) is 
decided through the purpose of the act. Therefore, instead of an intention to self destruct, 
the intention is a communication of distress, or to create a social intervention. This more 
functional interpretation of attempted suicide is a radical departure from the religious or 
legal understanding of the time (remembering that when this was published the Suicide 
Act of 1961 was still in place). This intention is estimated using the context surrounding 
the self harm.  
 
In 1959, Lennard-Jones and Asher proposed another term to distinguish attempted suicide 
from failed suicide. Using the terms “doubtful pseudocide” and “spurious suicides” – 
where doubtful suicides are “gambling with death”, while spurious suicides “never meant 
to kill themselves” – they created fragment within the continuum (1959, p. 1138). This 
further segmentation of pseudocide reveals the extend to which boundaries are arbitrary 
and negotiable: the demarcation of the continuum into categories and subcategories 
shows how psychiatric medicine is using persuasive rhetoric to define and medicalised a 
“suicidal performance” as a demonstration of distress (Lennard-Jones & Asher, 1959). 
Removing the suicidal intention is a further development to the self harm category. 
 
Due to complications with pseudo-homicide, or its spoken similarity to suicide, 
pseudocide was only used in the literature for a short time. After this, there was a 
reversion to the original term of attempted suicide, and in the mid 1960s, the concept of 
attempted suicide really formed its own identity; more terms, definitions and statistical 
measurements were added to the attempted suicide knowledge base. At the same time as 
these new knowledges were being formed, the approach to self harming episodes takes a 
functional turn. Instead of the individual’s psychiatric state being the focus, the attention 
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is turned to the social consequences. Self harming behaviours are still very much 
associated with mental illness, but theories of social manipulation start to be seen in the 
literature (e.g. Stengel & Cooke, 1958). As Batchelor and Napier wrote: “their suicidal 
attempts had compelled the attention of others to the seriousness of their sickness, and 
had this facilitated more effective treatment” (1954, p. 264). Lennard –Jones and Asher 
imply that it is a “hysterical gesture” an intense distress that cannot be communicated 
with words (1959, p. 1140).  
 
As the manifestation of a suicidal performance, self harm is subject to fashions and 
norms, but in whatever form it takes, attempted suicide was seen as a social 
demonstration of a severe state of mind, and its potency comes from attempted suicide 
being so closely associated with failed suicide. So, regardless of it being poisoning, 
overdosing or the modern incarnation of cutting, at this point in the literature attempted 
suicide was seen as a method of facilitating a social response, as in the example above, 
such as treatment.  
 
The behaviour of attempted suicide (still in Stengel’s use of not failed suicide) was 
construed as being socially manipulative; there was a sense that if it was not a sincere 
attempt, then it therefore must be feigned (see The Lancet, 1965). Moreover, if it is 
feigned, then “these acts of self-damage tend to be regarded as purely demonstrative and 
manipulative” (British Medical Journal, 1965, p. 1322). It seems that the pendulum has 
swung back the other way; instead of being almost synonymous with failed suicide 
(indeed, as seen as part of the same continuum), it is seen as being almost theatrical, 
purely a way of “generating concern” (Lancet, 1974, p. 936). Not all research was this 
cynical, this understanding was seen by some to be a double edged sword, there is 
concern that attempted suicides will lack impact if seen as mere theatrics, which could 
result in more dramatic and risky acts (Aitken, Buglass & Krietman, 1969, p. 115). The 
professional psychiatric attitude to self harming behaviour was still very much in flux.  
 
Other changes to the psychiatric understanding in the mid 1960s included Kessel’s 
proposal to replace attempted suicide with “self poisoning” or “self injury” (1965). This 
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alternative term was recommended on the grounds that reference to suicide was a 
misleading term, and alluded to failed suicide rather than Stengel’s attempted suicides. 
The issue of failed rather than attempted suicide is an issue that haunts the literature. This 
did not receive unanimous support, an anonymous article in the British Medical Journal 
responded: 
 
The literature on suicidal acts has been bedevilled by semantic confusion. Until 
recently the term suicide was often used for both the fatal and the non-fatal act. 
The necessity to distinguish between the two has in recent years been accepted. 
Now Professor Kessel proposes to drop ‘attempted suicide’ and speak of ‘self-
poisoning’ or ‘self-injury’ instead. But ‘self-poisoning’ is apt to lead to new 
confusion because most people when told that a person has poisoned himself will 
think that he is dead. Certainly, ‘attempted suicide’ is not a good term either, for 
it sounds too rational and suggests a planned effort, but it does refer to the self-
destructive component of the act and the risk in the individual runs in taking a 
poison the effect of which he is unable to judge. (1965, p. 1323). 
 
In this extract, it can be seen that the contemporary issues that surround self harming 
behaviour are being discussed. It demonstrates how precision is needed to distinguish the 
range between failed suicide and mild self harm, but that the terms which psychiatry 
insists upon using are unsuitable. Kessel’s proposed “self poisoning” also reflects the 
contemporary trend of overdosing on barbiturates – and does not classify the behaviour in 
abstract terms (unlike self harm, or self injury, it refers to a mode of self harm) creating a 
problem when other methods of self harm become more common. But the more 
abstracted attempted suicide was not satisfactory either: in Aiken et al. (1969), all 
references to attempted suicide are surrounded with quote marks, implying that it is not 
the usual denotation that is to be read and that there is no suitable alternative.  
 
The development of self harm as a category has so far been convoluted. It appears that 
there is a group of people that are different to those who fail suicide, and this group (with 
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shifting names and identified characteristics) is still attached to the suicide label, but also 
seen as separate. Hill (1969) set a new precedent: he used “self harm” as coterminous 
with Stengel’s use of suicide attempt. Hill acknowledged that it “is difficult to estimate 
the significance of an attempt at self harm, [so] an arbitrary decision was made to include 
only those attempts mentioned in the in-patient summary […this] must result in 
excluding minor suicidal attempts…” (1969, p. 301). In this extract, we can still see that 
there is a continuum of suicide attempts, one end of which is suicide and the other is what 
will become self harm as we now know it. The oxymoronic “minor suicide attempt” is 
the dominant psychiatric terminology in the 1960s. It is also here where we see this 
selecting bias; only using in-patient records will bias the sample used in psychiatric 
research.  
 
Keeping with this chronology, the next major development was in 1970, when Birtchnell 
separates attempted suicide from threatened or contemplated suicide: 
 
Suicidal attempt has been taken as a definite and determined attempt to harm 
oneself. The act must be been initiated, but life need not have been endangered. 
Suicidal contemplation or threat must have involved reference to the suicidal act, 
though it need not imply serious intent. (1970, p.308).  
 
This attempt at creating a new sub-category, that of “threatening suicide” never caught on 
as a psychiatric category, but did impact upon the way that self harm was later 
understood. Those that threatened suicide were counted and correlated with later 
completed suicides, and this self harming behaviour was used to predict later attempts. 
This relationship is still assumed in today’s psychiatric journals (as in Hawton, Zahl & 
Weatherall, 2003).  
 
A change to the nomenclature of attempted suicide was proposed and later defended by 
Kreitman, Philip, Greer and Bagley in two letters to the British Journal of Psychiatry 
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(1969; 1970). These two texts elaborate on the arguments put forward against Kessel’s 
self poisoning diagnostic category and also against the continued use of attempted suicide 
as a term, presenting ‘parasuicide’ as a solution to these problems. He used parasuicide as 
a better term to indicate the concept of failed suicide. Despite initial oppositions 
(Merskey, 1969; Stengel, 1970), parasuicide had some impact, in the British Journal of 
Psychiatry alone there are close to 300 articles referencing parasuicide (compared to just 
two articles related to the earlier pseudocide). One of the perceived advantages of 
parasuicide was that it could incorporate both self poisoning and self injury cases. This 
shows that psychiatric medicine were willing to group these two behaviours together, as 
linked with a single disorder; drawing the boundary around these two groups. By 
labelling these two under the same term, allows the new category of self harmer to begin, 
it is no longer only understood in relation to suicide, nor to the behaviour, but to 
something else. Indeed, to confirm this new group, in 1974, White renames this same 
category “intentional self harm”. Simultaneous to the re-naming, the causes and 
motivations changed: research articles focus on the ‘escape’ aspect, rather than the 
functional or psychotic explanations.  
 
The first use of intentional self harm was defined as being “a hasty, ill considered escape 
activity” (White, 1974p. 33), and those who resorted to self harm were having an “acute 
emotional upheaval, a background of normal developments, precipitated by problems, 
usually temporary, of the sort that appear particularly intense to the adolescent” (ibid, 
p.27). White also tried to separate intentional self-harm from any connotations of suicide, 
the first sign of discrete type of person in the psychiatric literature. White was incredibly 
influential on the development of self harm, in this paper, he almost suggests that it is an 
extreme stage of normal development. Now, the understanding of the typical 
demographic details of the typical self harmers increases. The usual self harmer has “a 
great deal of social pathology” (Kennedy and Norman, 1973), has personality problems 
(Lancet, 1974), and is usually a teenager, from the lower classes, with poorer educational 
background, and a disturbed family unit, and statistically more likely to be from an ethnic 
minority (White, 1974). As this concept of self harm becomes more established, more 
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details concerning the characteristics of a self harmer are circulated, and form scientific 
knowledge (Hacking, 2006). 
 
Following White’s precedent Morgan, Pocock and Pottle (1974) tried to “avoid 
deficiencies inherent in current terminology such as attempted suicide, self-injury or self-
poisoning” by using “deliberate self-harm as a useful alternative which is sufficiently 
general in meaning yet free from implied motive” (p. 606). They defined deliberate self 
harm as “deliberate non-fatal act, […] done in the knowledge that it was potentially 
harmful” (ibid, p. 320). This definition did not last long, a year later, the same authors 
(with some additions) altered their definition, to include a theme that self harm could be a 
recurrent disorder “an act of deliberate self harm is in many cases a symptom of 
continuing disorder rather than a turning point in a patient’s life” (Morgan, Barton, Pottle, 
Pocock, Burns-Cox, 1976, p. 366). It was at this point in the literature when self harm 
became considered as a maladaptive behaviour, an attitude that is still upheld by the 
grassroots today.  
 
In Morgan et al. (1976), the continuum between attempted suicide and demonstrative 
attempts was divided into three types: personal, interpersonal and social. Personal reasons 
include a genuine intention to commit suicide or alleviate suffering, interpersonal motives 
were attempts to influence others or to communicate distress, and social motives were 
those which try to “influence a particular aspect of his social situation” (p. 367). These 
three levels of motives recognise the subjective nature of self harming behaviours; it is 
only the psychiatric belief of the proponent’s intention that distinguishes them from each 
other. This is a clear claim of territory, in this situation the only person with the authority 
to classify someone as a self harmer is a professional in psychiatric medicine.  
 
The next big alternations in the evolution of self harm as a concept happened in 1986 and 
1988, when the creation of two ‘survivor’ activists groups occurred (Cresswell, 2005). 
These two pressure groups (Survivors Speak Out, and Bristol Crisis Centre for Women) 
were formed to provide a support network and to improve the treatment given to self 
harm patient in accident and emergency units. The label ‘survivor’ was a crucial change, 
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according to Cresswell (2005), this was the first time survivor had been used rather than 
‘patient’ or ‘ex-patient’. Survivors are so labelled because they “have survived an 
ostensibly helping system which places major obstacles in our path to self-determination” 
(Campbell, 1992, p. 117). More than any other change, these survivor activists wanted to 
have an active role in their health, to be able to control, possess authority and to have 
self-advocacy over their ‘constitutional’ rights. What this is really asking –when it is 
remembered who is requesting this – is for those who are classed as mentally ill to be 
granted autonomy and authority over their bodies on the grounds of experience. The 
members of this movement clearly did not see themselves as mentally ill: independent 
self harmer survivor conferences were held, (Asylum, 1989, pp.16-17). This open 
challenge to the psychiatric literature attempted to claim initiative and control over self 
harm, and use a definition that the self harmers were satisfied with, without need for a 
psychiatric label. This resistance to the psychiatric label works through generating a new 
discourse originating from new institutions. This is exactly the counter actions to which 
Hacking refers (2006). Through conflicting classifications, experts, institutions and 
knowledges, the meaning of self harm is negotiated between psychiatric medicine and 
survivors (Hacking, 2006, p. 5). 
 
One of the most lucid self presentations of survivor concepts of self harm was spoken at 
the 1989 conference, where Maggy Ross’ speech (as reported in Cresswell, 2005) 
declares who she is, why she self harms and how medicine misunderstands her:  
 
I’m Maggy and I started to cut my body 5 years ago. I go to casualty and get 
hauled onto the psychiatric bandwagon. I am then given a nice little ‘label’. The 
current label is Schizophrenia. That’s how the professionals see me. I’m a self 
destructive Schizophrenic. But how to I see myself? I am survivor of sexual abuse 
and a survivor of the system. I know why I self injure. When I feel I am losing 
control, I reach for a razor and prove to myself that I can have control over my 
body. When I am lost for words, my cuts speak for me. They say – look – this is 
how much I am hurting inside… I’ll tell you what self injury isn’t – and 
professionals take note. It’s not attention seeking. It’s not a suicide attempt. So 
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what is it? It’s a silent scream. It’s a visual manifestation of extreme distress. 
Those of use who self injure carry our emotional scars on our bodies. (Pembroke, 
1994, pp.13-15). 
Despite Maggie claiming she is misunderstood, she uses the same tropes as medical 
discourse to describe herself. The way in which these survivors understand self harm is 
not very different to the psychiatric theories: the communication of distress, and the 
initiation of help, are both given by Morgan et al. (1976). So the only real argument is 
over the medicalisation of (what both groups agree on being) extreme emotional distress. 
Psychiatric professionals see these emotions as being abnormal and needing regulation, 
while survivors do not see the emotional disturbances as needing medical control. The 
effects of self harm scars are the reason why the self harm community came under the 
medical gaze, but the real argument is not about cutting yourself; it is about the limits of 
pathological emotions, and the way you handle these emotions being classified as a 
psychiatric concern.  
 
The survivor movement can be seen as a second wave anti-psychiatry movement, 
initiated from the grassroots and missing the academic force of Laing (e.g. 1960) or Szasz 
(1960). The original anti-psychiatry movement challenged the use of medications and the 
existence of mental illnesses, Laing famously argued that schizophrenia is a consequence 
of hyper-reality (Laing, 1960). Survivors created a community of sharing experiences, 
especially of misdiagnoses and maltreatment, which resulted in the intensification of the 
evangelical fury of the lobbying campaigns, resulting in changes in NHS policy and a 
written declaration of rights (Cohen, 1998). 
So far, two different groups have been portrayed as contributing to the knowledge on self 
harm. The psychiatric discourse has been plotted from its beginning in the 1950s until its 
clash with the second force of survivors. These survivors generated knowledge from their 
experience, rather than the scientific method. Due to survivors campaigning, later 
research has worked with the self harmer to create new knowledge (e.g.  Fortune, Sinclair 
& Hawton, 2008; Laye-Gindhu & Schonert-Reichl 2005; Scoliers et al. 2008). It is these 
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interactions which propel the looping effect, the labelled engage with the category, and 
by doing so, alter how the classification is understood.  
The second phase of research (i.e. post survivor activism) has narrowed its focus: there 
are hardly any mentions of mental disorders, and instead the focus is on predictors of self 
harm, and on self harm as a predictor (Hawton and Fagg, 1998). As such, self harm is not 
necessarily seen as a mental disorder, but rather linked with identities and being a type of 
person. Through this development of the psychiatric literature, what it is to be a self 
harmer has become more complex, and associated with certain traits (the typical age, sex, 
class, etc) have become more known, and the next medical research focuses on this 
group, creating a more narrow definition, and generating knowledge about this group. 
This shows that there are characteristics that are granted as being essential in this group 
of people, so much so that Haw, Hawton, Houston and Townsend (2001) argued that the 
self harm population might have changed since the 1970s. 
However, this further research does not mean that there is a common understanding of 
self harm. In 1997, the World Health Organisation defined self harm (or in their terms, 
deliberate self harm) as being an act which has a non fatal outcome, which was 
deliberately initiated, with the intention of “realising changes that the person desires via 
the actual or expected physical consequences”, and which is not considered an habitual 
behaviour (Platt et al. 1992, p. 98). The additional clause of not being a habitual 
behaviour is interesting, not only does it rule out alcoholism, smoking, and rituals, it also 
omits routine self harm which self harmers may use.  This excludes habitual self harming 
practices, implying that only sporadic cases of self harm are to be considered medically.  
 
It is necessary to discuss Favazza’s Bodies Under Siege (1996), in which he compares 
‘self mutilation’ as a psychiatric category to social rituals in other cultures. He uses 
ethnographic sources to show that self harm (rather than a sign of a mental disorder) is a 
display of the mind dominating the body. This comparison between clinical patients and 
small scale societies is highly insulting to the cultures used, although it does highlight the 
social sanctioning of some self harm behaviours. Favazza (1996) used self mutilation and 
body modification to stress a qualitative gap between these acts and failed suicide. This 
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appears to be boundary work in action, by proposing that there is at least a type of self 
harming behaviour which is not indicative of any mental distress, it can be expounded 
that self harm does not necessarily have to have an underlying mental disorder: “the 
deliberate destruction or alteration of one’s body tissue without suicidal intent. There are 
no necessary negative connotations.” (p.xiix, 1996).  
 
As he wrote it as a cultural studies text, Favazza’s work has had only a slight impact on 
psychiatric literature. He influenced Webb and Turp (both 2002), who are both on the 
margins of serious psychiatric medicine. Both Turp and Webb argue that (in Favazza’s 
terms) self mutilating behaviour can be adaptive, it “can be a coping strategy in anxiety 
and is a protective element against suicide” (Webb, 2002, p. 236). By arguing that self 
mutilation can be preventative of suicide, Webb reverses all of the assumptions of 
previous research where self harm was used an as precursor to suicide. She does maintain 
that self harm (as opposed to self mutilation) is part of the failed suicide continuum, but 
fails to point to a distinguishing feature between self harm and self mutilation. Webb’s 
addition to the knowledge concerning self harm has merely muddled and further fractured 
an already complicated concept.  
 
This issue of unanimous understanding is not aided by Turp (2002), who has an 
alternative conception of self harm. She places self harm on a spectrum from failed 
suicide to good enough self care. Due to this extended scale, it is possible to cause self 
harm by omission, such as anorexia or neglecting medication. In addition to this, to be 
considered self harming behaviour, it must transgress a cultural expectation. Turp’s 
definition is the only one that can come over the problem of smoking and piercing as 
being literally self harming behaviours and ones that do not provoke clinical concern, 
allowing psychiatric medicine to create universal ‘laws’.  
 
Glossing over these mavericks for the time being, the definition of self harm is still an 
issue. In some papers an operational definition was conspicuously absent (e.g. Owen, 
Horrocks & House, 2002). This could either indicate they believe that a satisfactory 
working definition has been unanimously agreed upon, or alternatively, that they are not 
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sure how to conceptualise self harm, especially in relation to their international review. 
There have been other attempts to avoid the issue of definition of self harm, for example: 
 
Self harm includes non-fatal self poisoning and self injury. The former is defined 
as the intentional self-administration of more than the prescribed dose of any 
drug, whether or not there is evidence that the act was intended to cause self 
harm. It also includes poisoning by non-ingestible substances and gas, provided 
that the hospital staff consider these are cases of deliberate self harm. Self injury 
is defined as any injury recognised by hospital staff as being self inflicted. (Zahl 
& Hawton, 2004, p. 70). 
 
In Zahl and Hawton, it suggests that it is the subjective opinion of the medical staff 
whether a case is to be considered. This is a circular argument, the medical definition of 
self harm on what ever medical professionals consider self harm to be. In some ways this 
has brought the advocacy which the survivors demanded; if a case can persuade the 
medical professionals that they need no mental health treatment, then presumably they 
are not labelled with a mental health label (other than that of self harm).   
 
The development of the classification does not end there. Further precedent has been set 
with more recent research. Studies focus on the teenage prevalence rates, on associated 
links with family break ups, disturbed friendship groups (Moses, 2009), on the mixed 
intentions and communications of self harm (Scoliers et al., 2008), and on the media’s 
influence in causing and preventing self harm. This all contributes to building a more 
detailed picture of what and who a self harmer is. Due to the impact of the survivor 
movement (and a more ‘customer centred’ heath system), research is asking teenagers 
and self harmers how they understand self harm, and how they recommend dealing with 
it (Fortune, Sinclair, and Hawton, 2008). In some respects, research is asking the self 
harmers and the public how they think self harm should be understood (Collins and 
Evans, 2002). It is in these ways which the classified can affect their classification; they 
have direct influence on how they are made up.  
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It is worth reviewing at this point how far the medical nomenclature has changed. Self 
harm evolved due to the fracturing of the concept of suicide, and was taken into the 
psychiatric realm. Not only has the terminology changed since the 1950s, the meaning, 
connotations and definition has changed: from seeing all acts which appear like suicide as 
being attempted suicide, there are now degrees of suicidal intent. From having only one 
interpretation –an intention to kill oneself – there are now multiple (including social 
manipulation and maladaptive escape strategies) purposes of self harm. The question of 
who has the ability to apply this label (professional psychiatrists or the self harmers) and 
generate knowledge is a conflict which is still ongoing. These themes will continues into 
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Part II: Investigating Clinical Self Harmers Relationship with the Concept of Self Harm 
 
In this section, the relations between the contemporary psychiatric understanding and self 
defined clinical self harmers will be discussed. The evidence presented will illustrate 
Hacking’s looping effect (2006). It is a limitation of Hacking work that few examples are 
used; it is intended that this research will bolster his theory. To conduct these analyses, 
NSHN and MHF discussion boards between the first and the 14th of June were analysed. 
As stated before, no direct quotes can be used for ethical reasons, but evidence to support 
Hacking’s theory shall be provided in footnotes. All statements contained in quote marks 
are indicative of paraphrased posts. The content will be looked at terms of discourses, and 
four selected themes will be discussed: relationship to clinical concepts, self presentation, 
treatment regimes and concealment. 
 
At this point it is necessary to say that people are not homogenous, nor do groups of 
people have ‘essences’, but what is important to realise is that we treat people as if they 
possess metaphysical essences, which unite a group under a common identity (Hacking, 
2006, p.14). So, by no means are clinical self harm patients identical, but we think about 
them in terms of an archetypal model of the self harmer; any selected case could hold an 
position in radial relation to the typical, central model of self harm (Hacking, 1995, p. 32; 
Rosch, 1975). These categories are known by both those within and outside of the 
flexible defining border, and presumably self defined self harmers have an idea as to their 
relative position to the centre model. And, depending on their behaviour within certain 
contexts, their proximity to the epitome of self harm will alter: while using an online self 
harm forum the facet of their identity concerning self harm will become more prominent, 
when moving house, or commuting to work, or applying for a bank loan, their self harm 
identity is out of focus. So, clinical self harm identity is not necessarily pervasive over all 
of life. However, there is still much to be said about the common attitudes and 
understandings that this group of people possess, how this knowledge was generated and 
how the power relationships are constructed. 
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As it has been shown, a self harmer as a type of person has only been formed recently. 
Before the late twentieth century, self harming behaviour was seen as an indicator of 
suicide. It is only recently that the expectations and norms of self harmers have been 
created. These norms are created by the scientific investigation of this type of person, 
through medicine’s application of statistics. Hacking (2006, p.10) suggests ‘ten engines 
of discovery’: counting, quantifying, creating norms, correlating, medicalising, 




The current medical discourses surrounding self harm (as described in the previous 
section) has been engaged with by clinical self harmers. The ideas used by medicine to 
define and explain self harm as a psychiatric category are reflected in the language used 
on the self harm websites
12
. In these online discussion forums, individuals refer to 
themselves using the medical classifications, define themselves as being clinically 
depressive or as having an anxiety disorder
13
, they label themselves in term of psychiatric 
categories which can be used as heuristics for other readers to use. Some postings on the 
discussion boards use the same language not only to classify themselves, but also to 
describe their experiences. For one forum user, her self harming behaviour is a “symptom 
of stress” and “a frequent precursor to a dissociative phase”14. She shows evidence of 
being embedded in the medical sphere: the two categories she chooses to refer to -that is 
to say, dissociation and stress- are the two locations in which self harm is indexed in the 
DSM-iv (APA, 1994). This is an example of her expressing her own experiences through 
a medical lens: the language she uses is framed in terms of medical knowledge, and 





 Hacking goes into some detail about what these engines are, and what the consequences of the engines 
are. However there is not enough space here to go into the depth which these engines deserve, so it is 
recommended that Hacking (2006) is read.  
12
 The two forums which are being used to analyse clinical self harm attitudes are: the National Self Harm 
Network forum: 
http://www.nshn.co.uk/forum/index.php?PHPSESSID=a3a4425997fb53c0611d09a8688e697b&board=5.0 
and the self harm branch of the Mental Health forum: 
http://www.mentalhealthforum.net/forum/forumdisplay.php?f=29  
13
 See post #1, http://www.nshn.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=50276.0  
14
 See post #2,  http://www.mentalhealthforum.net/forum/showthread.php?t=4998  
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It is not unusual for a new post to begin with a rough profile of who is posting, typically 
how long they have been self harming, the time elapsed since they last harmed, and 
frequently, what diagnosis they are under and what medication they are taking. Blunt 
confessions such as “I have diagnosed depression”
15





 display the medicalised way in which these individuals see 
themselves and the way in which they expect others to see them. As these users are 
presenting themselves as medical case studies, this highlights the extent to which medical 
science has shaped how clinical self harmers understand themselves. This demonstrates 
the full effect of making up people, these clinical self harmers relate to others through a 
medical label. As they express themselves in terms of medical categories, and experience 
themselves through this classification, it shows an internalisation of the medical 
discourse.   
 
Not all clinical self harm forum users are so comfortable introducing themselves 
according to their diagnoses. Some individuals are somewhat ambivalent towards their 
category. In one post, a forum user stated how it would take time to accept his medical 
condition as an integral and internal part of himself
18
. This remark is indicative of two 
simultaneous ideas. Firstly, it assumes that medicine is irrefutable; that psychological 
measures taken reflect an irresistible internal condition that truly exists. Secondly, this 
poster assumes that it is necessary for him to come to terms with this diagnosis, and the 
ambivalence towards being medicalised is temporary. It is also worth observing that 
despite not being at ease with accepting his mental illness as part of himself, he expects 
that others would want this information. Only through a medical frame does he present 
himself to other people. This example illustrates the impact of medicine, this labelled 
individual feels the pull of his diagnosis, and adheres to medical knowledge knowing him 
more than he knows himself. As power is constituted of systems of relations, we can see 





 See post #8 , http://www.nshn.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=49961.0  
16
 Sertraline is a Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor type antidepressant that is also prescribed for 
obsessive compulsive disorder. 
17
 See post #8, http://www.nshn.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=49763.0  
18
 See post #12,  http://www.mentalhealthforum.net/forum/showthread.php?t=5044  
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This population’s relates to medical knowledge in a way which demonstrates Foucault’s 
model of power. Clinical self harmers’ understanding of self harm as a psychiatric 
category has engaged with and is congruent with the medical understanding. However, 
this is not a one-way process, both the psychiatrists and the patients they work with affect 
each other’s ideas. Due to dissemination of knowledge through conferences, publications, 
and discussion forums it is not surprising that these transferred concepts rapidly evolve. 
The self defined clinical patients tend to see self harming behaviours as indicative of 
internal, emotional distress, a pressure that cannot be communicated or released through 
normal means
19
: the same ideas that are frequent in psychiatric research. Interestingly, in 
the same way that issues of pain, the physical consequences of self harm and the 
corporeality of the subject are absent from psychiatric journals, so are these omitted from 
the online forums. The missing body is replaced with a hyper conspicuous discussion of 
embodied emotions, tapping into discourses about internal pain being expressed in the 
physical experience of self harming.  
 
The comprehension of emotion that is used by clinical self harmers uses a hydraulic 
metaphor, stemming from Freudian themes (Freud, 1963). Freud was influenced by 
Helmholtz’s theory of closed systems and conservation of energy, and saw the psychic 
energy within each person’s mind as subject to the forces and tensions which can be 
understood (and thereby controlled) using the principles of catharsis, cathexis and 
sublimation (1963, pp.10, 32 & 80). Catharsis is the act of expressing internal tension 
with the aim of releasing tensions. Cathexis is the investment of emotional energy into 
another person or object, and as such is not as relevant to the purposes of this research. 
Sublimation and other defence mechanisms are an attempt by the unconscious to protect 
the fragile ego (1963, p73). It is apparent in the language through the way that users of 
the self harm forums discuss their understanding of self harm, that Freud’s ideas are still 
prevalent: Freud’s impact has lasted longer in the public understanding of psychiatric 





 See post #2, http://www.mentalhealthforum.net/forum/showthread.php?t=5055  
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Frequently, users of the NSHN and MHF talk about ‘releasing pressures’ and self harm 
being a ‘coping mechanism’ which can express internal conflict and thoughts
20
. 
Obviously, this Freudian understanding of emotions as the hydraulics within a closed 
system is outdated, yet despite this, as a metaphor it is still used, especially in defending 
self harm as a ‘coping strategy’, an idea with more than a passing similarity to a Freudian 
defence mechanism of sublimation (changing a negative outward force into –in this case- 
inward facing negative force).  
 
Another feature which maintains the Freudian understanding of psychiatry are what the 
clinical self harmers call “urges”
21
. According to the popular psychology, these urges are 
wishes, desires or appealing thoughts to self harm which originate in an unconscious 
source. Urges are internal and tidal: they are not a constant force, but instead are seen as a 
destructive and unpredictable power that intends to overcome their will22. Urges are seen 
as something that you have to fight against. In addition, the methods that are circulated to 
combat this self-destructive streak are modern elaborations on defence mechanisms, such 
as ‘sublimation’ and ‘displacement’ or distraction. Advice posted on forum boards 
frequently recommends channelling the aggressive force into other activities, such as self 
indulgence or exercise23, such as “taking a bath”24, “reading a book”25, “shopping”, 
“going to the gym”
26
. This transfers a socially disapproved act (self harm) into a socially 
endorsed behaviour.  
 
It is in the medical sphere where clinical self harmers distinguish themselves from  emo 
teenagers who self harm; according to the clinical self harmers emos who self harm are 
not doing so as a sign of deep internal stress and need psychiatric help, but rather are 




See posts #3, #4, #5, and #11 http://www.mentalhealthforum.net/forum/showthread.php?t=4998, and post 
#2 on http://www.mentalhealthforum.net/forum/showthread.php?t=5055 . 
21
 See post #4, http://www.mentalhealthforum.net/forum/showthread.php?t=5125 for an example of how 
‘urges’ is used as a concept.  
22
 See post #4, http://www.mentalhealthforum.net/forum/showthread.php?t=5125  and post #1 in 
http://www.mentalhealthforum.net/forum/showthread.php?t=5164  
23
 See post #3, http://www.nshn.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=49847.0  
24
 See post #3, http://www.nshn.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=49847.0  
25
 See post #3, http://www.nshn.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=49847.0  
26
 See post #3, http://www.nshn.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=49864.0  
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on NSHN and MHF are keen to distinguish themselves and their group away from emo 
stereotypes; they see self harm being linked with emo, a group with which they go not 
want to be affiliated27. There is a close association between self harm and emo according 
to public knowledge (Sugden, 2008), but clinical self harmers are keen to be distinct from 
emos, clinical self harmers see themselves as more genuine, as having authenticity 
because of a medical diagnosis, and any accusation that all self harmers are emos is 




Clinical self harmers separate themselves from emo self harmers in the way in which they 
present their online profiles. It is typical to post a short biography when starting your first 
thread
29
. In these introductions, several points are usually covered: how long they have 
been self harming, what form (e.g. cutting) and frequently a psychiatric classification 
such as “I have emotionally unstable personality disorder”, “I have unipolar depression” 
or “I have severe anxiety disorder” etc
30
. This medical identity is also portrayed by 
informing other forum users of the drugs which they are currently taking. These forum 
users also discuss what medications they have had experience, in terms of efficacy and 
side effects. Medications such as depixal, Mirtazapine, Citalopram, Diazepam, 
Propranolol, Quetiapine etc.31 are referred to using non-trade names, mimicking medical 
knowledge through exposure
32
. By presenting themselves in terms of a medical 
classification, these individuals present their self harm identity clearly in terms of a 
psychiatric illness regulated with psychiatric drugs. This is a clear illustration of Rose’s 
arguments (1996; 2070b).   
 
Another key area in which clinical self harmers differentiate themselves from emo self 




 See post #4, http://www.mentalhealthforum.net/forum/showthread.php?t=5136 , and #7 and #8  
http://www.nshn.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=49859.0 
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 See post #8, http://www.nshn.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=49859.0 
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 For an example, see post #1, http://www.mentalhealthforum.net/forum/showthread.php?t=5136, post #1 
http://www.mentalhealthforum.net/forum/showthread.php?t=5055 , and post #1 
http://www.mentalhealthforum.net/forum/showthread.php?t=5041  
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 For example, post #1, http://www.nshn.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=50276.0 
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 These are fairly common prescription drugs, which are used to treat depression, anxiety, and stress. 
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 See post #1, http://www.nshn.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=50276.0  
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relationship to psychology professionals is largely restricted to school counsellors, while 
clinical self harmers have a closer relationship with higher ranking medical professionals. 
As such, most frequent response to any question posted is to go and seek professional 
medical advice
33
. The role of the doctor is wider than being a physician; doctors are 
expected to be able to treat mental illnesses. Medicalisation is not just medical 
professionals colonizing more and more of our selves, it is also the masses offering up 
their selves for examination and medical scrutiny (Foucault, 1982).  
 
The closeness of the client-doctor relationship is demonstrated in the way forum users 
talk about ‘their’ psychiatrist or doctor
34
. This relationship can be very possessive, on one 
thread an individual talks about her distress at her therapist leaving her
35
. In a long post 
detailing how her therapist has given her notice to leave in a week, after working with her 
regularly over a six month period, the poster speaks in very emotionally attached terms 
about the end of this relationship; she says she would have preferred short term sessions 
and a less intense relationship if she knew that her therapist would be leaving so soon. 
She states that if she knew from the beginning that her therapist would be moving away, 
she would not have invested so much in the relationship
36
. For this patient, this medical 
relationship was extremely valuable and more than purely medical. Their therapist was 
the embodiment of knowledge; this figure knows what is wrong, and how to fix it. This 
client got more than medication from the therapist; she is the source of knowledge. The 
closeness between medical practitioners such as psychiatrists, therapists, counsellors and 
doctors to their patients or clients is a significant relationship for the individuals who post 
on the forum. This relationship between patient and therapist can be seen as a new form 
of Foucault’s pastoral power; an individualising gaze which relies on confession. 





 See post #2, #10,  http://www.nshn.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=49851.0, post #2 
http://www.mentalhealthforum.net/forum/showthread.php?t=5041 , and post #4  
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The confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the 
subject of the statement; it is also a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship 
[…] a ritual in which the expression alone […] produces intrinsic modification in 
the person who articulates it. (Foucault, 1990, p. 61-62).   
 
The act of confession in this context is seen as redeeming and therapeutic, while at the 
same time it allows people to be transformed into case studies, in to statistics and 
monitored under the gaze of surveillance medicine. Therapists, counsellors and 
psychiatric professionals are the new figures of pastoral care, who can command and 
direct these self harmers, but are also in the position of being commanded by their clients 
therapists are in a position to be commanded by the patient (see Foucault, 1982 p. 783; 
Rose, 2007b, p. 6). The impact of this pastoral relationship is that it necessarily enmeshes 
clinical self harmers into the network of medical powers. Bringing these subjects closer 
to the source of the creation of a new kind of person strengthens the interactive evolution 
of making up people.  
 
From reading NSHN and MHF, it is clear that most clinical self harmers have seen a 
form of medical authority concerning their self harming behaviours. It is hard to tell 
whether this is a regular appointment, or a one-off occasion, and whether this is 
accompanied by medication, but it is fair to say that clinical self harmers are highly 
medicalised beings. Furthermore, it is evident that clinical self harmers are very aware of 
the procedures and treatments available on the NHS
37
, and also aware of their rights as 
self harmers38. It is this knowledge of the medical system that traps the psychotherapist, 
doctor, and psychiatrist in to the system as much as the clinical self harmers. The layers 
of surveillance are not just acting upon patients.  
 
In relation to psychiatric medicine, clinical self harmers refer themselves to medical 




 See post #5, http://www.nshn.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=49629.0 for an example of intimate 
knowledge of NHS policy.  
38
Bodies under Siege (a self harm survivor lobby group) have created their user of rights   
http://buslist.org/pdf/billofrights.pdf  
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works, and what treatments/drugs are available to them
39
. In one of the most interesting 
discussion threads, an individual declined a psychiatric test (Clinical Outcomes in 
Routine Evaluation (CORE)). He was later sent the CORE questionnaire by post, where 
he filled in his answers and later marked himself. When his scores for ‘well-being’, 
‘functionality’, and ‘risk’ classified him as needing corrective treatment, he asked the 





Consciously controlling the public face of your mental health to your own psychiatrist is 
problematic: the care of the psychiatrist is dependent on access to the client’s mind and 
mental states, and consequent treatment is provided accordingly. By gate keeping 
information, he is not only altering the current treatment, but also keeping the medical 
documents clear of being labelled a ‘risk’, and as Foucault has argued, it is the classifying 
documents which define you politically and for posterity (1972, p. 6). This person’s 
awareness of the risk of being classified in a detrimental category affects the way he 
presents his ‘medical’ identity, which has effects on his treatment, his medical label and 
implies that he wishes to manage his ‘medical face’. This power struggle is a dispute over 
who has the authority to categorise.  
 
So far, the clinical self harmers’ attitude towards self harm as a category, as a part of their 
identity, and their relationship to treatment has been discussed. There is one final theme 
that will be subjected to analysis: concealment. Concealing is a highly symbolic act: to 
conceal is to hide, which necessarily entails someone from whom self harm behaviours 
are hidden. This brings us to the question, why should a person want to censor him or 
herself, and if they do so, does this indicate shame or privacy: what is the motivation? If 
we remember that clinical self harmers define themselves to each other using medical 
terms and as being ‘self harmers’, then does this projected identity change when talking 
to a different section of society? What motivations do clinical self harmers have to hide 




 See post #6, http://www.nshn.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=49866.0  
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Out of the sixty discussion boards on the NSHN, three were a direct request for advice on 
concealing scars41. In one post, a person who works with primary school children 
described wearing a sleeveless t-shirt with ‘fresh’ cuts covered but revealing self harm 
scars
42
. She describes how she answers children’s curiosity by saying her scars were a 
tattoo, or due to a household cat, but still fears that she “could have given them ideas”. 
This woman has made a deliberate decision to display old, healed scars, but has kept 
recent cuts hidden. This may suggest that it is the ‘freshness’ of the cuts which is a factor 
in concealment. One of the responses to this post says that the extremist reaction that the 
school could have was to ask her to keep her scars covered. The common understanding 
is that employers can request concealment. Depending on whether the individual conceals 
wholly for herself or due to explicit external pressure alters what can be taken from this 
practise. If concealing occurs to project an illusion of being a non self harmer, then 
clinical self harmers are buying in to the idea that they are deviant and abnormal. If 
covering up scars is due from overt pressure from employers then this compliance may 
indicate something else.  
 
In another discussion board post, an individual asks whether anyone has come across 
specialist scar make up, or found a concealer which works well to disguise scars
43
. This 
demonstrates that these self inflicted scars should be not revealed in public, that scars 
symbolise a part of themselves that is meant to remain hidden. In some posts, covering up 
physical traces of self harm is a symbol of regret over their actions
44
, or that scars are a 
reminder of a bad emotional time45, or that they expect society to judge them if scars are 
visible
46
. This shows that the reason for concealment is multifaceted, not only are scars 
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There is an evident conflict at work. Clinical self harmers are happy to concede that these 
scars are physical evidence for a psychological problem, that their emotions cross over a 
threshold and are physically manifested47, but also believe that so long as the scars are 
covered, the evidence for having a mental disorder is also concealed. A superficial 
covering of their scars (which they see as a physicalized emotion, their distress written in 
razored incisions) restores clinical self harmers to full citizen status. So long as they 
conceal this evidence, employers, colleagues, and the public must treat them as normal 
people. 
 
The Survivor Subgroup 
 
The NHSN is an internet resource, calling itself a ‘survivor-led’ self harm support 
group48. So, it should be noted that one of the undercurrents throughout the discussion 
boards is propelled by this lobbying force. Self harm survivors are a potent minority, who 
see their experiences as having equal authority as medical expertise
49
. This is not unique 
to self harming individuals; this new ‘survivor’ movement has reached across psychiatry 
in a smaller and less revolutionary way than the 1960s anti-psychiatry movement (see 
works by Laing, (e.g. 1960) and Szasz (e.g. 1960) for examples of the full force of the 
anti-psychiatry movement). In this second, weaker wave, survivors are asserting their 
‘rights’, and limiting the medical space which doctors and medical professionals have 
authority over. Furthermore, they see the site of their body as being in the realm of their 
own possession, and claim authority over any medical treatment on the grounds that their 
experience has as much authority as medical qualifications (Collins & Evans, 2002).  
 
These self styled survivors are seen as a resource for other forum users, their experiences 
are written as long, detailed, biographic posts
50




 See post #10,  http://www.nshn.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=49961.0  
48
 http://www.nshn.co.uk/  
49
 The experience based, survivor led alternative force to medicine is discussed in detail in Collins and 
Evans, 2002.  
50
 See http://www.nshn.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=49943.0 for a detailed biography. 
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inspiration by other forum users
51
. This movement to uphold their rights as survivors is 
interesting, they are reclaiming “control from the experts and the institutions”, and to do 
so, they are “creating new experts, new institutions” (Hacking, 2006, p. 12) such as the 
national self harm network. Even more interesting, not only are they asserting the rights 
of themselves as experiencing beings, they are using the medical terms and knowledge in 
order to do so. This is not unique to self harm survivors, Nye discusses how wide-spread 
use of medical knowledge can be used as a form of resistance (2003, p. 124). The 
paradox of lay expertise is a double edged sword; it can defend the rights of these 
survivors, but does so by embedding them further into the medical discourses.  
 
This section has discussed four aspects that were found in the rich data sample. It has 
been demonstrated that the usual understanding of clinical self harmers are closely related 
to the medical discourses, but the way in which they choose to engage with medical 
concepts of self harm have affected the medical understanding, which has altered the 
patterns of normal behaviour present in the grassroots. The clinical self harmers 
experience and understanding of self harm will now be contrasted with that of another 
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Part III:  Investigating Emo Self Harmers Relationship with the Concept of Self Harm 
 
In the last section, clinical self harmers were used to illustrate Hacking’s looping effect 
(2006); showing how those labelled interact with their categorisation and change it. In 
this section, an alternative interaction with the category will be presented. The data 
analysed is taken from EB52 and VT53 discussion forums between the first and 14th of 
June. Due to ethical constraints, no direct quotes can be used, so any speech marks are 
indicative of paraphrasing. The same four topics (as used in the previous section) of 
definition, identity, treatment and concealment will be discussed.  
 
As stated in the previous section, the groups that are analysed are not homogeneous, nor 
are they static. However, the forces of power which alter the field of available actions 
impact differently to those acting on clinical self harmers compared to emo self harmers. 
These two groups are not distinct, their boundaries are permeable. However, the 
quintessential emo and the archetypal clinical self harmer are very different in terms of 
age, social position and responsibilities.  
 
Emo subculture is linked in the public eye with self harm (Frith, 2009; Sudgen, 2008). 
This is commonly understood by the emo self harmers, but they do not monopolise the 
label of self harm as being purely theirs. Emos are aware that adults and other teenagers 
self harm, and see their self harm as being the same as emo self harm. So, both emo and 
non emo self harm is seen as equally valid, equally motivated and equally determined. 
One emo self harmer was preparing a presentation for school assembly, raising awareness 
by sharing his own experiences of self harm with his school
54
. This thread discussed what 
information should be disseminated: the lower secondary school audience should know 




 http://www.emobucket.com/  
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aware of the statistics and the facts”
56
. This suggests that teenagers are already aware 
about the prevalence of self harming behaviour, through music (and their favourite self 
harm themed songs were recommended as music for the assembly57) media58, and 
popular culture much more than the general population. Emos have a clear definition of 
self harm, but one that does not engage with official medical discourses, which will be 
discussed shortly.  
 
In this same thread, it was acknowledged that self harm is associated with emos, but not 
to the exclusion of other groups of people
59
. It was stressed that “anyone could self harm” 
and it is not for attention, instead its purpose is to negate the internal pain by causing 
physical pain
60
. So, emos accept that others self harm, but interestingly, rather than 
seeing themselves as being as valid as the clinical patients who are highly medicalised, 





The medical discourses that run through the language and ideas expressed in Virtual Teen 
and Emo Bucket are touched upon, but without the knowledge or experience of the 
medical system to back up claims. For example, these teenagers argue that they have not 
seen the school counsellor because they “have a phobia of counsellors”
62
, or that they 
cannot stop cutting themselves because they are “addicted”
63
. These terms are in common 
use outside of psychiatric discourse, but the impact they possess is inherently because of 
the medical tones of addiction and phobia. Neither ‘addiction’ nor ‘phobia’ is used in a 
way which psychiatrists would approve, but they have more weight than non-medical 
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medical label is the ultimate trump card against contradiction as it claims authority from 
an acknowledged science. 
 
The emo interpretations of medical constructs are not the same as the medical meaning. 
To illustrate, depression, self harm and even what constitutes a scar to emos are different 
to psychiatric and medical understanding. Depression is often cited as a reason for self 
harm, and often referred to possessively as “my depression”
64
, without any evidence of 
medical diagnosis or treatment. Especially in the case of depression and anxiety, the 
terms are used for both the feeling and the medical disorder. So, there is usually 
ambiguity as to what sense these words are used.  
 
What is defined as self harming behaviour is also wider than the medical definition. In 
one thread, a poster was concerned that his excessive nail biting was tantamount to self 
harm; he “bites the top few layers off until his fingers are raw”
65
. Suggestions to clarify 
this ambiguous behaviour asked “whether he did it intentionally for the pain”
66
, whether 
it was intentional or “more an OCD tendency”
67
. The negotiation of what is meant by self 
harm is widened and inclusive, so that all who fall remotely near to the category of self 
harm can claim the label. The definition of self harm for emos is the literal meaning, an 
act that harms. This leads to behaviours such as “smoking and drinking being forms of 
self harm which your parents might do”
68
. In some ways, this definition is more 
sophisticated than clinical self harmers' definition, but really illustrates that emo self 
harmers do not engage with medical discourses. 
 
The final example of how medical language has been appropriated and interpreted by 
emos is the term ‘scar’. Common and medical understandings of a scar state that scars are 
newly formed tissue that forms after injury. It is usually assumed to be a permanent mark, 
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that can fade, and disappear entirely
69
: for example, one forum user says that her scars 
“‘will be gone in a couple of weeks”
70
. Again, this widening of the definition of scar 
shows a lack of interaction with the medical understanding. By allowing scars to refer 
also to fully-healable marks allows the category of self harmers to widen, incorporating 
more and more of emos into this new kind of person.  
 
These emos are keen to diagnose each other with illnesses; it gives them access to an 
identity that is defendable of the grounds of medicine. The psychiatric classifications that 
emos readily offer to each other are seen as eternal and true labels, locating agency and 
responsibility outside of the self harmer. Furthermore, the mental illnesses that are readily 
suggested (such as borderline personality disorder, depression, obsessive compulsive 
disorder, etc.) fit into the stereotype for the dysfunctional teen: pathologizing the 
institution of teenage angst in terms of psychiatric categories. Despite these terms being 
used as explanations for other’s behaviour, they are rarely used to define themselves. Nor 
are these suggestions maintained, a forum user who was suggested to have depression is 
not held to this label in subsequent posts. Again, it appears that another facet of emo self 
harm is based in transience, a removable element of their selves.  
 
The medical categories that are used to present themselves to the other forum members 
are accompanied with additional information to create a profile. These emos, especially 
when starting their first thread, present information as to give other forum users a sense 
of who they are and where they are coming from. Most first posts state how long they 
have been self harming71, the time elapsed since their last self harm72, and their social 
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and frequently explicitly state “I am a cutter”
76
. Unlike clinical self harmers, no 
statements concerning mental illness arise. More interestingly, individuals define 
themselves as “ex-cutters”77 and “retired cutters”78. This demonstrates that emos see the 
identity of a ‘cutter’ as a clear type of person, and as a category that these emo teenagers 
are confident using to define themselves. Not only that, but the self harm identity is so 
strong, that even when the self harm behaviours are absent, their relationship to self harm 
is still how they define themselves. Seen from the perspective of emo self harmers, these 
‘ex-cutters’ are a source of strength, information and have experienced ‘the other side’ – 
life without self harm.  
 
Contrasts can be seen between emo self harmers and clinical self harmers in the words 
they chose to define themselves. As discussed in the previous section, clinical self 
harmers use the medical categories (in which self harm is subsumed) to define 
themselves “I have depression’”
79
, while emo self harmers find it more suitable to 
classify themselves as ‘self harmers’ or ‘cutters’
80
. This shows that the official medical 
discourses have been adopted readily by the clinical self harmers, while the emo 
teenagers use an alternative understanding, one which does not have the prerequisite of a 
mental illness. In the infrequent cases where self harm is linked with mental illness, it is 
also coupled with another symptom: in one thread, someone woke up after cutting 
herself, but with no memory of doing so
81
 and suggested explanations for this severe 
memory loss included borderline personality disorder
82
. More typical examples of self 
harming behaviour are seen as a sign of distress and depression (in an ambiguously semi-
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imbalance. Due to the absence of any psychiatric explanation of self harm, any mention 
of mental illness are missing from the emo self harmer language.  
 
This brings us to the question, how are emo self harmers presenting themselves? What 
are the characteristics that they use to communicate their identity to the forum readers? 





, and generally “messed up”
85
. This conforms to the emo identity of 
complicated teen: a misunderstood malcontent amongst other misfits. Part of the identity 
of this group that is evident in the sampled forums is that of being misunderstood, or not 
being granted the respect they deserve. This is demonstrated in statements like “no one 
listens to what I say”
86
, “no one cares about me”
87
, and “I feel like two different people 
sometimes”
88
. This teen-with-issues is one of the staple stereotypes of the emo
89
, 
alongside fashion, melancholia and distinctive music (Greenwald, 2003; Simon and 
Kelley, 2007). However, this does not mean that these feelings are fake or less powerful; 
instead it shows how the teenage angst discourse has structures their experiences of 
themselves more profoundly than medical discourses.  
 
Emo self harmers are not shy of talking about the physical body – an aspect which is 
conspicuously absent from the clinical self harmers’ forums. As emo teenagers, they are 
conscious of their body and the way in which it is viewed by the world
90
; a fashionable 
way to conceal scars was a frequent topic on the emo forums (which were absent from 
the clinical self harmers discussions). The awareness of themselves as objects in the 
world, and as feeling subjects meets at this point: they discuss the corporeal self in 
relation to concealment, but are not reluctant to talk about the experience of pain
91
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This un-medicalised attitude to self harm does not mean that the self harming emos are 
not treating the issue with gravitas, on the contrary, they show a vast amount of concern 
for anything which falls under their broad umbrella of self harm
93
. However, the advice 
for treatment is somewhat less medical compared to clinical self harmers. The emo 
teenagers advise each other with ‘alternatives’ or ‘distractions’ to prevent self harm 
behaviour, but tell forum posters to “tell your parents”
94
 or to “talk to a school 
counsellor”
95
 about the underlying emotional conflicts. Suggestions to go straight to a 
doctor are rare; parents and school counsellors are the first port of call. It can be seen that 
parents and counsellors are the first layer of power to which the emo self harmers defer; 
in the hierarchy of observation, parents are the embodiment of wider discourses and 
attitudes. This is shown in the posts, forum users say that when they talked to their 
parents about self harm, their parents took them to a therapist or medical professional
96
. 
These teenagers are removed from direct medical contact, the mediation of parents 
enforcing and regulating medical interaction.  
 
This relationship of power can be seen as another manifestation of Foucault’s pastoral 
power: the act of confession to a person representing a layer of power. However, the emo 
self harmers both confirms and resist this structure: school counsellors are seen as the 
authority, but it is also clear from the forums that not many of the emo self harmers talk 
to school counsellors. Instead, this role of confidant and guru is adopted by the other 
forum users and school peers. The other forum users listen and advise on the grounds of 
common experience, those with the epithet of ‘ex-cutter’ being imbued with a higher 
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status through regular postings; the forum tracks how many times you have contributed to 
the website’s discussion board, and after certain milestones (50, 100, 250, 500 etc) users’ 
display profile is accompanied with an icon. In this way, status can be built up, creating 
an internal power system to the emo network.  
 
Returning to the issue of treatment, recommended ‘distractions’ and ‘alternatives’ to self 
harm are frequently suggested on these boards. On both EB and VT, specialised threads 
have been created to list alternative options and distractions for self harm97. Frequent 
suggestions for alternatives included “cutting a pillow instead”
98
, or “drawing with red 
pen”
99
, “holding ice cubes”
100
, while distractions are more typically “read a magazine, 
watch a film, go for a walk”
101
. As a rule, alternatives are seen as using the aggressive 
energy in a new, outward, (sometimes creative) direction while distractions are tasks that 
are intended to take your mind of self harming. Similarly to the clinical self harmers, the 
common understanding of a closed circuit, emotional hydraulic analogy is used, but emos 
are using these ideas in a more simplistic way. None of these usual suggestions has a 
medical tone, no mention of pharmaceuticals, nor therapy sessions discussed. This is a 
stark contrast to the posts of clinical self harmers, who discuss themselves in terms of the 
medical discourses.  
 
The emo discourse surrounding self harm lacks the medical overtones of the clinical self 
harmers’ forums. Because self harming emos are not engaged with medicine as clinical 
self harmers are, self harming emos do not often see themselves as medical objects. In 
most cases, they see having “someone to talk to” is enough102. Both PM and IM (private 
messaging and instant messaging) is seen as a way to reduce the self harming behaviours, 
and are frequently offered to members by each other
103
. This online social 
communication is considered a decent replacement for life outside of their computers; 
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, and as they are insulated from school, it is unlikely that a rumour 
of self harm “could be spread all over the year group”106.  
 
The themes of the typical emo self harmers’ profile, their definition of self harm, and the 
consequential treatment of self harming behaviour has been evaluated. The next theme to 
be considered is the motif of concealment on emo forums. Paradoxically, one of the most 
apparent thread topics is concealment: how to hide scars, how to stop parents from 
finding ‘tools’, how to prevent friends discovering your self harm secrets. From 45 
threads, four were specifically requesting concealment advice. There is an established 
belief that self harm is a covert action, yet there are public discussions concerning 
anything from “how deep do you cut”
107
 to stating “it has been four months since I last 
cut”108. This conspicuous concealment is perpetuated by emo fashion: bandanas and wrist 
bands are typical emo accessories, whether self harm scars are present or not. In one 
discussion thread, the fashionable alternative cover up to wrist bands was proffered: duct 
tape. Evidently, this is the latest fashion statement “duct tape conceals, but it is also kind 
of hot”, “they do that where you are too? It does look cool, yeah”
109
. The great advantage 
of these casual, fashionable coverings is that non self harming emos also wear them. This 
has two implications, firstly that emo self harmers are not conspicuous to others 
(presumably parents, teachers, and friends) but it also normalises concealment of scars, 
potentially giving the illusion of the majority of emos self harming.  
 
This ambiguity is yet another motif in emo identity. Typically the ambiguity is in relation 
to sexuality (Simon & Kelley, 2007), but it can be seen that this feign/genuine 
concealment grants emo access to an identity which their peers are exclusively aware. By 
engaging into discourse focused on teenage life and adolescent issues rather interaction 
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sphere to the same extent as clinical self harmers. The interesting point to observe is that 
emo self harmers ignore medical knowledge, but this medical knowledge has taken a 
specific interest in these teenagers (such as Fortune, Sinclair & Hawton, 2008; Laye-
Gindhu & Schonert-Reichl, 2005; Scoliers, et al. 2008), which informs the definition of 
self harm, which impacts on clinical self harmer.  
 
In this section, the self harming emos’ understanding of medical categories, their 
presented identity, the expected treatment and the motif of concealment has been 
evaluated. It should be apparent that the differences between clinical self harmers and 
emo self harmers are great – even when considered on these four aspects. Emo self 
harmers have a very different relationship to medical authority, medical authority is very 
interested in emo self harmers but this group are too focused within their own group to be 
grossly affected by the medical discourses. This one way relationship shows that emo self 
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Conclusion 
 
It can be seen from the evidence presented that emo self harmers and clinical self harmers 
understand and use the concept of self harm in different ways. Emo self harmers use their 
own definition of self harm (and other medical terms such as ‘depression’ and ‘scar’ are 
used in a way which is not identical to the medical usage) to include the widest possible 
meaning, emo self harmers present themselves in terms of emo themes rather than 
medical themes, are not integrated into medical treatment, and emos conspicuously 
conceal scar areas whether or not there is evidence of self harm to be hidden.  
 
On the other hand, clinical self harmers show a detailed awareness of the medical system, 
the drugs and therapies available, and use medicalised language in a way which is similar 
to psychiatrists and medical professionals. Typically, a diagnosis is part of their presented 
self. Clinical self harmers tend to be enmeshed in the medical system, in the form of 
pharmaceuticals or a cognitive or behavioural therapy. Concealment was a much smaller 
issue for the clinical self harmers; it was a rare topic of discussion. In general, clinical 
self harmers saw themselves as medical beings; this is evidence of the embodiment of 
medical discourses. This group take an active role in their medicalisation; they actively 
seek and act out the construction of scientific truth, self-regulating themselves as limited 
by the medical knowledge. This is a real illustration of Foucault’s theory of power and 
knowledge.  
 
Foucault’s understanding of power is complex, far more sophisticated than, for example, 
a Marxist top-down perspective. However, as these networks are in every relationship, 
suspending individuals and created by the individuals, there is no escape. There is never a 
point where every relationship of power is revealed. In this thesis, the relationships that 
have been discussed were those which were nearest the surface. It was not intended that 
every power link would be revealed; the connections that were between the key groups 
and over key issues were discussed.  
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Self harmers are not a universal group; it has been shown that clinical and emo self 
harmers are sufficiently distinct to be considered as two separate groups. Their have very 
different attitudes to medicine, but the medical world fails to distinguish between these 
groups. Furthermore, emo self harmers fail to engage in the medical discourses, while 
clinical self harmers’ behaviours, experiences and knowledge is affected by the medical 
world. Taking a medical perspective, the current psychiatric research focuses 
predominantly on teenage self harmers (e.g. Fortune et al.2008; O’Connor, Rasmussen, 
Miles and Hawton, 2009), rather than the already present clinical population. The 
interesting effect which this could have on the existing clinical population in terms of the 
looping effect is that as the medical understanding is being informed by a specific 
teenage population, the clinical self harmers may be shaped by this, moving the target 
towards the emo norms of self harm. Also, it would be interesting to see how these 
changes in the medical perception of self harm will be reflected in the next edition of the 
DSM-v. These are things which will be played out over time, and which will continually 
evolve.  
  
It is important to understand that the body is a symbolic and socially constructed site. It is 
the place of embodied emotions and the performance of identity. By experiencing their 
own self harm through either the lens of medical knowledge or emo discourse, the 
experiences of the self harmers are altered (Rose, 2007). This objectified understanding 
of themselves changes the content of their self; the discourse is internalised and becomes 
the self. In a sense, self harm infers internal characteristics of their selves, and renders 
them concrete, able to be measured, compared and explained (Rose, 1996). This is all 
another way of saying that the body has a political anatomy, is it “explored and 
rearranged” by a “mechanics of power”, which transforms and controls through discipline 
regimes (Foucault, in Rabinow, 1984, p. 182). These self harmers are suspended in 
relations of knowledge and power.   
 
In this thesis, Foucault and Hacking’s theories have been applied to two different 
communities of self harmers. The historical development from failed suicide to self harm 
has been plotted, and related to the changes in the typical demographics of the 
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medicalised target population. Two different groups of self harmers have been used to 
demonstrate the medical categorisation in action, and located these groups in relation to 
the medical discourses. The ideas of Rose, Hacking, and Foucault were demonstrated 
using examples from genuine postings on popular forums. As this research was grounded 
on this data, it provides support to Foucault and Hacking’s overly theoretical models. It is 
a demonstration that their methods have explanatory benefits, and that the use of these 
models result in new insights. Ideally, this research can be extended in two ways: firstly, 
across time, plotting how the understanding of self harm develops. Secondly, as a 
demonstration of how the self harm spectrum should be broadened to include body 
modificators or cross cultural groups in analysis.   
 
Self harm is a concept which is accessible both to specialists, self harmers and to the 
public, as self harm has been the subject of publications aimed at practicing medical 
professionals, psychology academics, survivors and at a wider, more general audience. 
The boundary work and negotiation of the concepts involved in self harm is messy and 
complicated, and is a microcosm of a larger dispute: does medicine have the right to infer 
mental states from physical actions? Who has the last word in defining our own 
behaviour? Only through reflexivity and constant analysis are these power relations 
revealed, only through understanding how these discourses affect the field of our 
potential actions can be seen how power relationships influence the choices we can make.  
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